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AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE IN DRAFT CLASSIFICATION OF
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS AND MINISTERS
An exemption from military service on the ground of conscientious
objection, as supported by evidence of subjective convictions, is a privilege
granted by Congress and not a right.' Since religious freedom includes
the right to act or not depending upon religious convictions, so long as
the national interest is not prejudiced, Congress has outlined service
requirements for conscientious objectors Draft boards have recently
experienced uncertainty as to their duty in formulating affirmative
evidence in order to sustain their rejection of the draft registrant's claim
to an exempt status in both minister and conscientious objector cases.
Determination of draft classifications involves utilization of objective
and subjective facts.' The former may result in concrete evidence for
classification; the use of the latter to ascertain a subjective state of mind
is more difficult.'
Responsibility for the selective service process rests with the local
boards.' Each has the power to determine, subject to the right of appeal,
1. Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). Congress has the power to require
performance of military service and may, if it wishes, disregard the views of draftees.
In this draft process, the registrant is granted an exemption, not as a matter of right,
but as a privilege. United States v. Hein, 112 F. Supp. 71 (D.C. Ill. 1953).
2. Selective Service is authorized under the Universal Military Training and
Service Act. 65 STAT. 75 (1951), 50 U.S.C. App. § 451 (1952). Further reference to
this Act shall be by reference to sections of the United States Code.
Section 456 (j) of the Act provides: "Nothing contained in this title shall be con-
strued to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the
armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and
belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code." This section outlines requirements for those who are only opposed to com-
batant training and also for those who are opposed to both combatant and non-
combatant training.
3. For a discussion of objective and subjective facts in draft classification re-
quests see United States v. Witmer, 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
4. White v. United States, 215 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 1954).
5. Each state has a director of selective service activities who is appointed by the
Governor. The number of draft boards required for each county depends upon popula-
tion. However, there must be one local draft board for at least every five counties.
The members of the draft board are volunteers who serve without compensation. Upon
volunteering, they are screened by selective service headquarters and are nominated by
the Governor to the President. The local board consists of three or more members who
are male citizens of the United States and who are residents of the area for which the
board has jurisdiction. Each member must be at least thirty years of age and not a
member of the armed forces or any reserve component. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11,
1604.12 (1951). See also 32 C.F.R. §§ 1604.51-1604.52a (1951).
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all questions with respect to induction for, or exemption or deferment
from, military training and service of all men registered in the board area.
Since classification is the vital step in providing available man power, it
becomes imperative that it be accomplished accurately and with fairness
to each individual.'
Initially the registrant is classified on the basis of his questionnaire.'
Subsequently, he is given ten days to request a personal hearing before
the local board. The hearing is mandatory upon request, and the registrant
is allowed to challenge the classification by presenting any new informa-
tion, to bring to the board's attention evidence they may have neglected,
and to rebut board conclusions. The board need not, however, give un-
limited time to the registrant for this purpose.' As in any action where
an individual is brought before an administrative agency which assumes
a quasi-judicial function he must be advised of the charges and evidence
from which a valid determination can be made.'
A government appeal agent is provided for each local board. This agent is pro-
vided to examine records and determine whether in his opinion any local board decision
should be appealed. Certainly this provision adds to safeguards afforded registrants.
32 C.F.R. § 1604.71 (1951). There is no error in procedure when the appeal agent as-
sists in the questioning of the registrant, for by such conduct he is determining the
necessity of appeal should the board decide against the registrant. United States v.
DeLime, 121 F. Supp. 750 (D. New Jersey 1954).
6. In the classification process there will be no discrimination because of race,
color or creed, or membership in any political or religious organizations. 32 C.F.R. §
1622.1(d) (1951). When a board bases a decision on these grounds its conduct becomes
lawless and it is, therefore, acting beyond its jurisdiction. Niznik v. United States, 173
F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925 (1949). United States v. Everngam,
102 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. W. Va. 1951).
7. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.1 (1951). The questionnaire is sent each registrant after he
has registered with his local board upon his eighteenth birthday.
8. The purpose of 32 C.F.R. § 1624.2(c) is to require the board to reclassify each
registrant on the basis of the discussion of his classification with the board and whether
or not he presents any new information. The section does not mean that the furnishing
of new information is a condition precedent to reclassification. United States v. Stiles,
169 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1948). This should not be confused with the regulation allowing
a registrant to report any new change of status which might require reclassification.
If the registrant reports a change in status, within ten days of its happening, he is al-
lowed a hearing before the board. 32 C.F.R. §8 1625.1-1625.2 (1951). As interpreted
by the court, the board has the duty to reopen this classification even though an order
to report for induction has been sent, provided, of course, the registrant has not been
inducted. United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953).
The selectee must be allowed to present his views at the hearing. If the board
fails to give the registrant this consideration his classification is void. Davis v. United
States, 199 F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1951). Bejelis v. United States, 206 F.2d 354 (6th Cir.
1953).
After each hearing the registrant is given another right to appeal the classification.
United States v. Vincelli, 215 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1954).
9. "The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence but also
a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them."
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1937).
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Each registrant is allowed an appeal to the state appeal board." At
this time he is permitted to enclose within his personal file any statement
in regard to local board classification." This agency then considers his
classification de novo. If his request is not sustained, the registrant may
take an appeal to the President unless the rejection was by unanimous
vote.' 2 If it should be so rejected, he has exhausted his appeal remedies
barring requests by the National or State Directors for appeal.'3 Ulti-
mately, draft classification can be challenged by writ of habeas corpus 4
or in a criminal prosecution for failure to be inducted. 5 The language of
the statute making administrative determination "final" has thus not
been interpreted by the courts so as to give the Selective Service System
the ultimate authority in classification. However, before the classification
can be attacked in the courts, the registrant must have taken the final
step of reporting for induction. Administrative remedies have not been
exhausted until report for induction and submission to the physical exami-
nation since rejection could still result at this point in the selection
procedure.'
The Supreme Court in Estep v. United States7 held that there could
10. 32 C.F.R. § 1626 (1951). The state appeal board is an independent organiza-
tion; it does not function under the State Director. The five members of the board
are appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Governor. The appeal
board strives to be a composite group and should include a businessman, lawyer, doctor,
a member from labor, and if possible a representative of agriculture. This board is also
uncompensated. Id. § 1604.22.
"The appeal boards are in no judicial sense appellate agencies .... A classifica-
tion given by an appeal board is not . . . merely an affirmance of the action of an
inferior agency, but is the independent act of such board." United States v. Moore,
217 F.2d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1954). Such de novo hearings should eliminate any
prejudices encountered by the registrant before the local board.
11. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.12 (1951). "The person appealing may attach to his appeal
a statement specifying the matters in which he believes the local board erred, may direct
attention to any information in the registrant's file which he believes the local board
has failed to consider or to give sufficient weight, and may set out in full any informa-
tion which was offered to the local board and which the local board failed or refused
to include in the registrant's file." Ibid.
12. Id. § 1627.3.
.13. Id. § 1627.1.
14. Ex parte Fabiana, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952). See also Note, 28 IND.
L.J. 244 (1953).
15. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
16. Cases indicating that the registrant must exhaust his administrative remedies:
Rowland v. United States, 207 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1953); United States v. Dorn, 121
F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Wis. 1954); Westerbeke v. Local Draft Board No. 2, Islip, N.Y.,
118 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. N.Y. 1954). This includes report for induction: Billings v.
Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542 (1944). See also Bradley v. United States, 218 F.2d 657 (9th
Cir. 1954).
17. 327 U.S. 114 (1946). "The provision making the decisions of the local boards
'final' means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act
the customary scope of judicial review which obtains under other statutes. It means
that the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification
448
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be judicial review of a classification only if there was no "basis in fact"
for the board's decision. Even though the classification appeared to the
Court to be erroneous, if there were conflicting evidence, a court could
not sit as a super draft board and substitute its opinion for that of the
draft board. If there is an erroneous conclusion of law, however, the
classification should not stand."8 Any danger of unlimited administrative
discretion resulting in a condition of administrative absolutism is remote.
During World War I conscientious objector exemption was extended
only to members of well recognized religious sects whose creed forbade
its members from participating in war and whose members' convictions
were in accord with nonparticipation.Y The duty required of draft boards
in such classifications was simplified by the necessity of this condition
precedent. The more liberal 1940 Act allowed an exemption to those
who due to religious training and belief,2" were conscientiously opposed .
to participation in war in any form. Later any objections based on philo-
sophical, political, -and sociological views, or on a personal moral code
were specifically excluded, indicating the requisite of religious belief as
grounds for conscientious objection.2 Even a standard based on "re-
ligious belief" is elusive of definition. It is difficult to maintain that one
must believe in a Supreme Being in order to be religious. The religious
impulse may be the response of an individual to an inward admonition
which might be called God or conscience.2 At this time, a belief in a
Supreme Being, requiring duties greater than those arising from any
human relation, sets the limit on the standard.2
Draft boards are more readily inclined to understand opposition to
war when expounded by members of one of the Historic Peace Churches
made by the local boards was justified. The decision of the local boards made in con-
formity with the regulations are final even though they may be erroneous. The question
of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no basis in fact for the
classification which it gave the registrant." Id. at 122, 123. See Note, 22 GEo. WAsr.
L. REv. 604 (1954). Connor and Clarke, Judicial Investigation of Selective Service
Action, 19 TuL. L. REv. 344 (1945).
18. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955). A classification based on an
erroneous conclusion of law was invalidated.
19. 40 STAT. 78 (1917).
20. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. 54 STAT. 885, 50 U.S.C. App. a
301 (1951).
21. See note 4 supra.
22. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943). The court stated,
"no matter how pure and admirable his standard may be, and no matter how devotedly
he adheres to it, his philosophy and morals and social policy without the concept of a
deity cannot be said to be religion in the sense of that term as it is used in the statute."
Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1946).
23. See note 4 supra.
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since their beliefs stem from a pacifist attitude. 4 Individuals have claimed
pacifist belief and have not been excluded from such status even though
belonging to a church which does not openly oppose war. However, this
pacifist belief must stem from religious convictions. "5 Certainly, Jehovah's
Witnesses have proved the most difficult to classify.2" They are not
pacifists for they believe in Theocratic wars, as opposed to wars between
political units. The members of the sect indicate that they will fight in
the final battle of Armageddon and openly profess belief in self defense,
that is, protection of home, loved ones, and those associated with them
in this religion. This naturally raised the question of whether or not their
beliefs came within the statutory language requiring "opposition to war
in any form." The Supreme Court recently held that it would be erroneous
to conclude as a matter of law that such a belief was not within the
24. The Mennonites believe that the burden of sin is on all mankind and that
they alone have been lifted into the community of love. They refrain from participa-
tion in the administration of the laws. Generally, this group did not participate in
combatant duty but did not object to alternative service. SIBLEY AND JACOB, CONSCRIP-
TION OF CONSCIENCE, 19-21 (1952). The Brethern believe that pressure of any kind
violates the spirit of nonresistance; they maintain a traditional peace church attitude.
Id. at 21-23. The Friends judge all matters by what they call the "Inner Light"; this
is God working through the informed mind on its sensitive conscience. The participa-
tion by individual members of this sect is based primarily on the circumstances of each
individual. Id. at 23-27. Such a position as this may not be far removed from the inner
feeling by those who have attempted to base their objection on what has been termed
political belief as distinguished from religious belief. "Mennonites, Brethern, and
Friends come to be called the Historic Peace Churches because their corporate beliefs
for so long a period had embraced the principle of conscientious objection to war, how-
ever different the interpretations of that principle might be." Id. at 27.
25. The Catholic Church does not have the principle of conscientious objection to
war, yet many Catholics have been classified as objectors. This is an individual de-
termination based on religious principles. Id. at 29.
In United States v. Alvies, 112 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Cal. 1953), the registrant had
declared his opposition to war but, as a matter of fact, he did not belong to any par-
ticular religious faith. The court concluded, "there is nothing in the statute or regula-
tions which requires membership in a sect or organization in order to qualify as a con-
scientious objector." Id. at 623.
26. One writer has given an indication of objector group cooperation during World
War II. "In terms of religious affiliation, the largest single group of c.o.'s who en-
tered the Army and Navy as noncombatants were the Seventh-Day Adventists. Among
those who rendered alternative civilian service . . . , members of the Historic Peace
Churches constituted about 60 per cent of the total. As for the objectors who on
various grounds were imprisoned, more than three-quarters were Jehovah's Witnesses."
SIBLEY AND JACOB, CONSCRIPTION OF CONSCIENCE, 85 (1952).
Jehovah's Witnesses are difficult to classify since they claim exemption as ministers
along with that of a conscientious objector. For a discussion of this position see pages
460-461 infra.
For a general discussion of this religious sect see McCown, Conscience v. The State,
32 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1944).
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statute.2 ' The test was seen not as one of opposition to all wars but
opposition on the basis of religious belief to "participation in war."2
The wars in which these believers will participate are those of a spiritual
nature between good and evil and without the use of carnal weapons.
Congress must have intended participation in more munaane wars.2 9
On the other hand, perhaps a nonpacifist attitude should be of significance.
If the religion prohibits attack with carnal weapons but permits the use
of such weapons in defense, it would seem that such a belief is no
different from that of many who believe that killing is morally wrong
but would resort to it in self defense.30
In accordance with the statutory exemption for conscientious objec-
tion, regulations have established classes of exemption commensurate
with each registrant's degree of objection. Each individual who would
have been acceptable for class 1-A if he were not conscientiously opposed
to combatant training is placed in class 1-A-O.3 ' These men will be
inducted into the armed forces and serve in a noncombatant capacity.
In class 1-0 is placed every registrant who would have been acceptable
for 1-A but who is conscientiously opposed to both combatant and non-
combatant service. 2 Registrants in this latter class will be assigned to
work of a national interest as determined by fhe local board." Statutory
exemption is also provided for ministers and those who are studying for
the ministry under the direction of a recognized church or religious organi-
27. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955). The Court indicated that
the question presented in this case was one of law. The belief of Jehovah's Witnesses
in Theocratic wars and the use of self defense did not as a matter of law preclude a
classification of this sect as one opposed to war in any form. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
The Supreme Court ruling gave affirmance to the decisions of circuit courts which
had held that a registrant's belief in the use of force in self defense was not incon-
sistent with conscientious opposition to participation in war in any form. Clark v.
United States, 217 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1954); lessen v. United States, 212 F.2d 897
(10th Cir. 1954).
28. "As to theocratic -war, petitioner's willingness to fight on orders of Jehovah
is tempered by the fact that, so far as we know, their history records no such command
since Biblical times and their theology does not appear to contemplate one in the future."
Sicurella v. United Stat~s, supra note 27 at 390, 391.
29. Id. at 391.
30. See dissent by Mr. Justice Minton in Sicurella v. United States, suprq note 27
at 395. "The petitioner is not opposed to 'participation in war in any form.' That is
the congressional test. On the contrary, he reserves the right to choose the wars in
which he will fight." He then continues in regard to use of carnal weapons by indi-
cating, "they do not, they say, carry carnal weapons in anticipation of attack, but they
will use them in case of attack." Id. at 396.
31. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.11 (1951).
32. 32 C.F.R § 1622.14 (Supp. 1954).
33. They will be assigned to this work for the normal tour of duty given draftees
but will be compensated in accordance with wages paid others performing work of a
similar nature.
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zation.34 Provision is made not only for duly ordained ministers but also
for regular ministers of religion. This latter classification includes those
whose customary vocation is that of teaching and preaching the principles
of the religious sect in which he is a member and whose members recognize
him as a regular minister of religion. Neither class of ministers includes
those persons who irregularly or incidentally preach and teach religious
principles. The statute and regulations are silent, however, as to the
applicable standard.
In Dickinson v. United States35 the Court established a standard
for ministerial classification which can be applied on an objective basis
for the determination of an objective fact. The registrant, a member of
Jehovah's Witnesses, was originally classified 1-A by his local board since
he was devoting about 40 hours per week to secular work. He was con-
tinued in 1-A after denial of a request for reclassification as a minister
pursuant to having left his secular employment to devote about one
hundred fifty hours per month as a minister of Jehovah's Witnesses.3"
The Court indicated that if the board were to contradict the draft regis-
trant's claim of exemption, it must look to evidence.3" It indicated that no
affirmative investigatory duty was placed on the local board, and that
the boards need not abide by the customary rules of evidence.38 Nor would
the court interfere if the facts were disputed; each board should resolve
the conflict.3" Further, the board could, if it desired, adopt the role of
investigator, that is, subpeona witnesses and documents, and obtain in-
formation from various agencies of the government or from the regis-
trant's neighbors." The Court stated, however, that, if the registrant
placed himself prima facie within the exempt ministerial classification
34. Section 456 (g) of the United States Code provides for exemption of ministers
and those who are studying for the ministry.
35. 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
36. This sect is unique in its doctrine in that each member is considered to be a
minister of religion by the various sect followers. Therefore, the applicable standard
for classification cannot be that of the particular religious sect. Quite often these in-
dividuals do not spend all their time as ministers but are also employed in secular
activities, thus placing many of them in a category of irregular, preaching ministers.
37. "[T]he courts may properly insist that there be some proof that is incom-
patible with the registrant's proof of examination." Dickinson v. United States, 346
U.S. 389, 396 (1953).
38. "Local boards are not courts of law and are not bound by traditional rules
of evidence; they are given great leeway in hearing and considering a variety of ma-
terial as evidence." Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. "The board is authorized to obtain information from local, state, and national
welfare and governmental agencies. . . . The registrant's admissions, testimony of
other witnesses, frequently unsolicited evidence from a registrant's neighbors, or in-
formation obtained from other agencies may produce dissidence which the boards are
free to resolve." Id. at 396, 397.
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and such evidence was uncontroverted, any 'dismissal of the claim solely
on the basis of suspicion and speculation [would be] foreign to our
concepts of justice." 1 The duty required of the board in such cases is,
then, to place in the record affirmative evidence that the registrant is not
entitled to an exemption. 2
It is obvious that the Court was not applying a test of substantial
evidence for it was explicit on this phase of the requirement. Also ex-
pressly rejected was a classification based merely on suspicion and specula-
tion. The draft board does not have a duty of determining that the
registrant is not a minister after he has merely stated that he is a minister 3
or that he is a member of a sect recognizing all members as ministers.4
Rather the claimant must first establish a prima facie case of ministerial
exemption by means of objective facts showing his standing as a regular
or duly ordained minister of religion. The board is under no duty to
establish that the registrant is sincere or that he has such inward convic-
tions as to establish his status as a minister since it does not deal with the
subjective beliefs and convictions of the registrant.
The standard in this type of registrant classification is clear. First,
it must be established that he teaches and preaches the gospel of his
religious sect.4' Then, it must be determined whether or not he supple-
ments this activity with secular employment. A showing that he does
should not be conclusive of denial of exemption for certainly there are
many ministers whose congregations are poor, thus necessitating secular
work in order to maintain any standard of living. However, the amount
of time devoted to secular activities must be examined along with the
amount of time given to ministerial activities. If a person is regularly
41. Id. at 397.
42. Further, it was indicated, "the task of the courts in cases such as this is to
search the record for some affirmative evidence to support the local board's overt or
implicit finding that a registrant has not painted a complete or accurate picture of his
activities." Id. at 396.
43. United States v. Thomas, 124 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. I1. 1954). In thil case the
registrant had been classified as 1-0 but sought a ministerial classification even though
he worked 40 hours per week as a brick mason. That the individual was not a minister
was evident from the record and the board did not need to make special findings to
support its refusal of the claim.
44. See note 36 supra. One court has indicated: "Whether he is a Jehovah's
Witness, or a member of another sect or denomination, a registrant's status as a minis-
ter should be determined according to the facts of the individual case, and according
to the realities of the situation,-not merely by what he professes." Neal v. United
States, 203 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 996 (1953). United
States v. Pomorski, 125 F. Supp. 68 (W.D. Mich. 1954).
45. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955).
46. See note 34 supra.
47. In Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953), the registrant found it
necessary to work about 5 hours per week, outside of his ministerial duties, in order to
earn a living, since he was not compensated for his ministerial activities.
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employed in secular work and irregularly engaged as a minister, he would
not come within the exempt classification. To be a regular minister the
duties should be carried on continuously with full participation in
religious activities.
The board need not go beyond the questionnaire to determine the
status of the registrant if the facts as given do not indicate that he is a
full time minister of religion." If this can be inferred from the record,
then there is a "basis in fact" for the determination with affirmative
evidence in the record that the registrant did not fully augment his claim
for exemption. Should the registrant show that he is a full time minister,
devoting little or no time to secular work, and the draft board then
disallows his claim without contradicting his showings, such action would
be held arbitrary and without "basis in fact."4 Under these circumstances
the local board would be compelled to assume the role of investigator.
In the classification of conscientious objectors, on the other hand,
the board is not involved in an objective determination of an objective
fact, but, rather, in the determination of a subjective fact-inward
religious convictions of opposition to war in any form-which necessarily
places a greater duty and responsibility on the board. Such a classification
also involves a need for evidence and a possible investigatory responsibility
should the board believe the registrant is sincere but still contradict his
claim for exemption.5"
Since the Dickinson holding draft boards have assumed varying
degrees of responsibility in objector cases. In a recent case, the Seventh
Circuit declared, "a distinction must be drawn . . . between a claim of
ministerial status and a claim of conscientious objector status as to
48. In United States v. Hoepker, 126 F. Supp. 118 (E.D. Ill. 1954), the registrant
claimed ministerial exemption even though he averaged only 65 hours per month in the
ministry. Since he had failed to place himself prima facie within the exempt classifica-
tion the board was justified in refusing his claim. See also United States v. Thomas,
124 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Ill. 1954), where the board was justified in refusing a minis-
terial claim because the registrant had indicated he worked 40 hours per week in secular
employment.
49. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
50. Ashauer v. -United States, 217 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1954). In this case the
registrant had originally been classified 1-0. He was later reclassified 1-A; this re-
classification was sustained on appeal. However, the court indicated that no conclusion
could be reached, on the basis of the material furnished by the registrant, other than
that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. There was
nothing to contradict the evidence furnished by the registrant or the sincerity of his
beliefs. If the board were to find evidence to contradict the claim it would have to
resort to some source other than the questionnaire or the personal appearance of the
registrant in a hearing before the local board. Accord, United States v. Benzing, 117




susceptibility of proof."'" It was suggested that perhaps the best evidence
to sustain a rejection of the claim of conscientious objection was not the
statements of witnesses or the questionnaire of the registrant, "but his
credibility and demeanor in a personal appearance before the fact finding
agency.. . . The Court's requirement of affirmative evidence in the
Dickinson case did not impose on local boards a burden of rebutting every
claim made irrespective of the degree of proof presented.5" Actually,
such a reading would convert the privilege into an absolute right. The
draft board is not limited by mere assertions of the registrant; if he has
failed to support a claim by evidence of religious belief, the local boards
are free to disbelieve him.5" If this were not the case, the burden would
fall on the Selective Service System to disprove the eligibility of all who
claim exemption.5" Proving a subjective state of mind by providing af-
firmative evidence as to the mental state of the conscientious objector
would be an impossible task.5"
The local board hearing becomes a searching process to determine
registrant sincerity. Questions are aimed at the objector with the purpose
of determining his credibility. The registrant is usually questioned con-
cerning religion and beliefs of his church, how long he has been a member,
his attendance at this church, the church's position on conscientious
objection, and whether or not it has publicly taken a stand.57 The
51. United States v. Simmons, 213 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 397 (1955). Simmons was reversed on the procedural ground that
the Department of -Justice failed to furnish the registrant with a fair r6sum6 of all ad-
verse information in the FBI report and thus deprived him of the fair hearing provided
by the Act.
52. Ibid. See White v. United States, 215 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1954) where the
court distinguishes the case before it and Dickinson on the ground that one is a claim
for ministerial exemption while the other is a conscientious objector case.
53. See United States v. Simmons, 213 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1954).
54. United States v. Wider, 119 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. N.Y. 1954). The only evi-
dence in the record consists of letters written by the registrant in which he explains his
convictions and how they stem from his religious training as a Jew. There is no proof
from others, and his file is silent as to any affirmative evidence obtained by the local
board either in support of or contrary to the claim. The registrant failed to make
out a prima facie case. "When the Dickinson case refers to the requirement of some
affirmative evidence to support the board's finding . . . it seems that what the Court
had in mind were cases wherein the registrant had submitted, in support of his claim,
evidence which was more than statements of a subjective state of mind relative to his
religious beliefs." Id. at 683. See United States v. Adamowicz, 119 F. Supp. 635
(N.D. IIl. 1954) where the registrant's claim was rejected because his belief was a
political one and did not stem from religious convictions.
55. United States v. Wider, 119 F. Supp. 676, 683 (E.D. N. Y. 1954).
56. White v. United States, 215 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 1954).
57. For a discussion of the local board hearing see SIBLEY AND JACOB, CoNscRIP-
TION oF CONSCIENCE, 59-60 (1952). The board could conduct a more searching examina-
tion if the members were fully versed in the matters of conscientious objection. In this
respect, this agency to which Congress has delegated the job of drafting of men is
different from the ordinary governmental administrative body. The use of the ad-
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registrant may be requested to explain his occupation, which might conflict
with his attitude toward assisting in national defense. Often, on the basis
of these answers, the board can determine that, even though the registrant
appears sincere in his beliefs, he would qualify for noncombatant duty
because of his civilian activities." Above all the board is desirous of
detecting those who have sought a church opposed to war in the manner
that the draft has sought draftees. The procedure must not allow the faker
to hide at the expense of the true objector. Certainly a very recent con-
nection with a pacifist church should not be conclusive of an intent to
evade the draft, but it is evidence to be considered. 9 Another fact which
may be considered is whether or not the registrant has publicly expressed
his beliefs."0 These factors combined-the totality of the registrant's
activities-can be examined to reach a decision.
Classification is based not only on information supplied by the
registrant in his questionnaire and conscientious objector form; local
board members are free to place information into the record to give stand-
ing to the classification.6 They may certainly use knowledge of a par-
ministrative agency is usually justified by the argument that the problem involved re-
quires initial expert consideration. In the selective service system, however, the mem-
bers of the local and appeal boards are not specialists; they have no special training or
preparation for the job. Many draft boards consequently may be inexperienced in
questioning draft registrants.
58. In White v. United States, 215 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1954), the registrant re-
quested a 1-0 classification indicating that he was conscientiously opposed to both com-
batant and non-combatant service. The facts as related by the registrant indicated that
he was employed in an aircraft plant. From these facts and the interview the board
declared that the registrant was not so opposed to noncombatant service as he was to
governmental service of any kind. The board then classified the registrant as a con-
scientious objector who is available for non-combatant military service only. See also
Roberson v. United States, 208 F.2d 166, 169 (10th Cir. 1953).
59. See Schuman v. United States, 208 F.2d 801, 805 (9th Cir. 1953). "The length
of time one has been connected with a faith has no bearing upon whether one is en-
titled to exemption as a conscientious objector. The only question to be considered is
whether the registrant has a sincere (i.e., 'conscientious') religious opposition to par-
ticipation in war in any form." Ibid.
See Imboden v. United States, 194 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1952). Failure to engage in
activities of a religious organization is not conclusive but certainly a fact to be con-
sidered.
60. In Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955), Mr. Justice Clark indicated
that a registrant's failure to show evidence of prior expression of religious belief was
a fact, though not controlling, to be considered in connection with the board's deter-
mination of the registrant's sincerity.
61. See Lehr v. United States, 139 F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1943). "The Local
Board is not a court that must swear witnesses, allow representation by counsel, and
act only on the evidence presented. It may act on matters within the knowledge of
the Board whether in evidence or not." Ibid.
Also, boards are not restricted to what would be considered competent legal evi-
dence in a judicial proceeding. See Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953);
Brown v. Spelman, 254 F. 215 (1918).
Even though evidentiary requirements are relaxed, it is essential that a fair hear-
ing be provided. The registrant should be made aware of the evidence considered by
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ticular family background or religious history to classify a registrant.
Conclusions formulated from evidence and used in the classification must
be recorded in the registrant's file. 2 This gives the registrant an opportu-
nity to examine evidence upon which his classification is based.
A standard of substantial evidence is not required to rebut the
claimed exemption in conscientious objector cases.63 Only a sufficient
factual indication of evidence incompatible with the registrant's claim is
necessitated. "4 Certainly, mere suspicion is not sufficient.6" If the board
believes that the registrant is sincere and there is no factual showing of
contradiction, then denial of conscientious objector classification would
be without "basis in fact."6 6 However, the board is under no investigatory
duty to construct an independent record in opposition to the registrant's
statements and conduct if they alone constitute a "basis in fact."6 The
evidence requirement is met if the board finds inconsistency in the record.
In Witmer v. United States68 the registrant initially sought an agricultural
the board. United States v. Balogh, 157 F.2d 939, 943 (2d Cir. 1946), judgntent vacated
on other grounds, 329 U. S. 692 (1947). See DAvis, ADmINISATIWE LAw 497 (1951);
Shipley, Conscientious Objection--A Legal Right, 13 FED. B. J. 282, 286 (1953) ; Con-
nor and Clarke, Judicial Investigation of Selective Service Action, 19 TuL. L. REv. 344
(1944); Comment, 34 B. U. L. REv. 361, 364 (1954).
62. "Under no circumstances shall the local board rely upon information received
by a member personally unless such information is reduced to writing and filed." 32
C. F. R. § 1623.1 (1951). In United States v. Bender, 206 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1953),
the draft board clerk testified as follows: "Well, they considered the information on
the Form 150, and I think the family is well known to all the Board members, and they
felt the information did not justify a change in classification." Id. at 250. The classi-
fication appeared to have been based on information which was never placed in the file.
The registrant was thus not informed of evidence upon which his classification depended.
See also United States ex rel. Remke v. Read, 123 F. Supp. 272 (W. D. Ky. 1954).
63. Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375, 381 (1955).
64. See De Moss v. United States, 218 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1954) ; Bates v. United
States, 216 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1954); Contra, Annett v. United States, 205 F.2d 689
(10th Cir. 1953).
65. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375 (1955); Dickinson v. United
States, 346 U. S. 389 (1953) ; United States v. Close, 215 F.2d 439 (7th Cir., 1954).
66. In Pitts v. United States, 217 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1954) the board placed noth-
ing in the record on which to base a decision or refute the registrant's sincerity. In
fact, it indicated that no further evidence had been disclosed by a personal hearing
and that it had not doubted the registrant's sincerity. See also Williams v. United
States, 216 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Weaver v. United States, 210 F.2d 815 (8th Cir.
1954). "To be sure, the Board may not accept the sincerity of the registrant's religious
belief and at the same time deny him the classification which the law gives one con-
scientiously holding that religious belief. To do so would empower the Board to arbi-
trarily classify registrants regardless of religious beliefs or convictions." Roberson v.
United States, 208 F.2d 166, 168 (10th Cir. 1953).
67. De Moss v. United States, 218 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1954). The registrant's
argument was that there were no facts to contradict the documentary proof submitted
by him. The court stated, "the difficulty with that position lies in the fact that the
documentary evidence . . . was contradictory and in some respects unconvincing and
subject to being deemed incredible by the draft board." Ibid.
68. 348 U. S. 375 (1955).
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exemption and indicated conscientious opposition to war. He specifically
indicated lack of ministerial status, but, subsequent to the board's refusal
of the agricultural deferment, he requested classification as a minister.
He had originally indicated that he wanted to assist the war effort through
work in agriculture and this was quite inconsistent with his later state-
ments indicating opposition to war in any form. This inconsistency justi-
fied the board in doubting, on the record, his credibility and refusing his
request.
In conscientious objector cases a registrant cannot make out a prima
facie case solely from objective facts as in ministerial cases since the
ultimate question to be determined is the sincerity of the registrant in
his objection to war in any form." Objective facts are used in objector
cases only to determine the sincerity of the registrant."0 The nature of the
registrant's claim, either that of ministerial exemption or conscientious
objection, thus determines the kind of evidence the board must find in
order to contradict his claim for an exempt status. The court in Witmer
said, "if . . . the issue is the registrant's sincerity and good faith, then
there must be some inference of insincerity or bad faith."'" For some in-
ference of insincerity or bad faith other than that indicated through ans-
wers to the questionnaire the board can show in the record that the
registrant's demeanor or character was unreliable or evasive in its meet-
ing with him." If there is no indication of this in the record, however,
69. Id. at 381.
70. "[A]ny fact which casts doubt on the veracity of the registrant is revelant."
Id. at 381-82. This type of fact is affirmative evidence.
71. Id. at 382.
72. In the Witmer case, the registrant's sincerity, during his personal appearance
before the local board, was not doubted. The Court indicated, however, that such a
doubt could be of importance in the process of local board classification. "Since Witmer
stated his beliefs with apparent sincerity, and since we find no indication anywhere in
the record that his demeanor appeared shifty or evasive or that his appearance was
one of unreliability, we must examine the objective facts before the Appeal Board to
see whether they cast doubt on the sincerity of his claim." Id. at 382. From this it
appears that the Court has left the door open for local board interpretation of regis-
trant behavior during the personal interview as a basis for classification. However,
the requisite of a record is vital. See also Ashauer v. United States, 217 F.2d 788, 791
(9th Cir. 1954), in which the court indicated that it would look to the personal hearing
to find evidence of a contradictory nature. In Tomlinson v. United States, 216 F.2d
12 (9th Cir. 1954) a local board was again faced with the task of evaluating a mental
attitude. "Attitudes and demeanors which develop at the time of such a person's per-
sonal appearance may well be the controlling factors." Id. at 17. See also White v.
United States, 215 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Simmons, 213 F.2d 901
(7th Cir. 1954), re'v'd o other grounds, 348 U. S. 397 (1955). Judge Learned Hand
indicated that the registrant's appearance before the Board may be sufficient to justify
distrust in his good faith. United States ex rel. Levy v. Cain, 149 F.2f 338, 341 (2d
Cir. 1945).
Certainly, it is difficult to evaluate the demeanor or character of the individual,
but the local board is in as good a position as anyone to attempt to determine a regis-
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then an examination of the objective facts can determine the incredibility
of independent statements which are seemingly credible.73  All that is
needed to support a classification is an inference from the registrant's
conduct or testimony of the incredibility of his statements or the insin-
cerity of his claim.
A special appeal process is outlined in the statute for all conscientious
objectors." This does not include ministerial claims which follow the
regular appeal procedure. 5 If the local board, after its hearing, fails
to sustain the conscientious objector claim the case is referred to the
appeal board. Before this agency makes a final determination the file is
forwarded to the Department of Justice for investigation by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Subsequent to this investigation a hearing is held
before a hearing officer, and the registrant is allowed to present his wit-
nesses and rebut any information which was disclosed by the FBI report."
This is an investigatory proceeding, as contrasted with the local board
procedure, since an affirmative duty is placed on the Department of
Justice to invesigate the registrant's claim through the FBI. Therefore,
this hearing may include evidence of which the local board was unaware
in its process of classification, and a "basis in fact" may thus be supplied.
The statute makes no provision for examination of the FBI report
by the registrant, but a recent case indicates that the registrant must be
presented with a fair r6sum( of this report.7 ' The entire FBI report need
not be made available but may be kept secret if necessary to safeguard
the procedure for getting such information. The Supreme Court recently
held that, "a fair r~sum6 is one which will permit the registrant to defend
against adverse evidence-to explain it, rebut it, or otherwise detract
trant's sincerity. If he does appear evasive, and this fact is placed in the record, then
it would appear that the classification is determined on a "basis in fact."
73. Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375 (1955).
74. See 50 U.S.C. A' r. § 456 (1) (1952). 32 C.F.R. § 1626.25 (Supp. 1954) con-
tains the special provisions that are applicable when the appeal, involves a conscientious
objector claim.
75. See note 10 supra.
76. "The Department of Justice, after appropriate inquiry, shall hold a hearing
with respect to the character and good faith of the objections of the person concerned,
and such person shall be notified of the time and place of such hearing." 50 U.S.C.
App. § 456 (j) (1952). See also United States v. Borisuk, 206 F.2d 338 (3d Cir. 1953).
The Court there stated that, "upon request . . . the hearing officer will advise the
registrant as to the general nature and character of any evidence in his possession which
is unfavorable to, and tends to defeat, the claim of the registrant, such request being
granted to enable the registrant to more fully prepare to answer and refute at the hear-
ing such unfavorable evidence." Id. at 341 n.3.
77. See Shepherd v. United States, 217 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1954); Tomlinson v.
United States, 216 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1954); United States v. Lynch, 155 Supp. (S.D.
Cal. 1953).
78. United States v. Nugent, 346 U. S. 1 (1953). The hearing officer prepares
this r~sum6 and informs the registrant of his right to receive it.
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from its damaging force."79 Certainly, a decision of an administrative
agency should not be reached without giving the affected party an opportu-
nity to know and rebut evidence upon which the decision is based.
Subsequent to this hearing, the hearing officer, after examining the
local board file and the FBI report and personally questioning the regis-
trant so as to view his demeanor, sends his classification recommendation
to the Department of Justice."0 This agency then forwards a recommenda-
tion to the appeal board, which is only advisory. A recent decision indi-
cates that the registrant is entitled to receive a copy of this report and to
be given an opportunity to reply to it prior to final appeal board classifi-
cation."' A regulation provides that the registrant has the right to enclose
statements relevant to classification with his application of appeal.8 2 This
will have little significance unless he is afforded an opportunity to reply
to the Justice Department's report. By giving the registrant this right,
the appeal board will have a complete record on which to base its decision.
It should be remembered that the registrant has had an opportunity to
meet this evidence in a personal hearing before the hearing officer. The
report is merely a summary of what transpired and gives a classification
based on rebuttal testimony from the registrant. It would seem that this
requirement now gives the registrant power to question the correctness
of conclusions on which he has previously testified.
Presently the statute provides for an FBI investigation and hearing
on conscientious objector status only if the local board has failed to
sustain the claim. 8 If the registrant receives a conscientious objector
classification, and also requests a ministerial status, and on appeal to
79. United States v. Simmons, 348 U. S. 397, 405 (1955). There has 'been a dif-
ference of opinion as to whether an individual can properly rebut this FBI report if he
is not given an opportunity to see it. A question also arises as to what test there is,
if any, for determining whether the registrant has received a fair r~sum6. See Sheats
v. United States, 215 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1954) and Brewer v. United Statees, 211
F.2d 864 (4th Cir. 1954) where a hearing officer's report and an FBI report were
inadvertently placed in the registrant's file; he was allowed to see them since each had
been instrumental in his classification. See United States v. Edmiston, 118 F. Supp.
238 (D. Nebraska 1954); United States v. Stasevic, 117 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. N. Y.
1953). See the following language in United States v. Evans, 115 F. Supp. 340 (D.
Conn. 1953). "I cannot . . . determine that the r~sum6 was fair without an oppor-
tunity to inspect the investigative report of which it is claimed to be a r~sum6. I think
the Act should not be interpreted to mean that any communication by the hearing offi-
cer to the registrant with reference to the investigative report is conclusively presumed
to be a fair r~sum . Even if the r~sum6 given be deemed presumptively fair, on trial
the registrant must be allowed to combat the presumption by the only means possible,-
comparison with the investigative report itself." Id. at 343. This problem remains un-
answered.
80. See 32 C.F.R. § 1626.25 (1951).
81. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U. S. 407 (1955).
82. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.12 (1951). See note 11 stupra.
83. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (j) (1952).
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the state appeal board both requests are denied, he is not granted a hearing
with the Department of Justice."4 It would seem that the investigation and
hearing as an aspect of fair play and substantial justice should be afforded
any registrant who is denied conscientious objector status regardless of
whether his claim was originally sustained by the local board."5
Ministerial classification should present little confusion among local
boards since exemption is based on ascertainable objective facts. On the
contrary claims of conscientious objection may still result in much litiga-
tion due to the impossibility of accurately ascertaining subjective religious
convictions. In either case the board must at times assume an investigatory
role in order to contradict the registrant's claim. Evidence needed to
support a rejection of ministerial exemption may be based on facts pre-
sented by the registrant which indicate inadequate and irregular ministery.
Here subjective probing is unnecessary, and the board assumes the role
of investigator to find objective facts to rebut a registrant's prima facie
case. In cases of conscientious objection, if the board believes the
registrant is sincere, contradiction of the registrant's claim again requires
assumption of an investigatory function. This is apart from obvious
inconsistencies (objective facts) in the questionnaire and requires sub-
jective probing; a draft board may reject the claim if the registrant's
demeanor and character appear uncertain and evasive from the personal
hearing. An inference of insincerity which casts doubt on the registrant's
84. This situation will occur only under limited circumstances. Normally, if a
registrant requests and receives a 1-0 exemption he will not appeal this classification.
However, many who are members of Jehovah's Witnesses, after receiving a 1-0 desig-
nation, will also request classification as a minister. They do not forfeit the 1-0 classi-
fication by this request. See De Moss v. United States, 218 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1954).
"The statute plainly says that when that claim is denied reference shall be made to the
Department of Justice. The clear meaning of the amended regulation is that when that
claim is granted, the appeal board may proceed with the classification without referral
to the Department of Justice." Id. at 126, 127. See also the following cases which
indicate that the registrant should be afforded a hearing if he is a conscientious ob-
jector. Blevins v. United States, 217 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Sterrett v. United
States, 216 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1954); United States v. Crawford, 119 F. Supp. 729
(N.D. Cal. 1954).
85. See 32 C.F.R. § 1626.25 (Supp. 1954). The Department of Justice hearing
has become very important, since a copy of the report must now be sent to the regis-
trant. It can now supply the "basis in fact" for classification. The Supreme Court
has not been hesitant in affording procedural safeguards when the statute was silent.
This is evident from the Nugent and Gonzales decisions. See note 78 and 81 supra.
In the original 1940 Senate Bill, there was a provision for a register of all conscienti-
ous objectors, whose names were immediately referred to the Department of Justice
for an investigation and hearing. 86 CoNG. REc. 12038 (1940). This procedure was to
antedate any local board classification. It may be surmised that Congress intended a
hearing for all conscientious objectors prior to refusal of the claim. It might be argued
that this report will uncover items not known to the local board and will be detri-
mental to the registrant. However, it would seem that this investigation may correct
any erroneous information compiled by a local board.
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veracity is all that is necessary. As a standard for review this seems not
far removed from suspicion which is only authenticated by means of
injecting such doubts into the record.
CONSIDERATIONS IN DETERMINING THE LIMITATIONS ON
STATE POWER TO REGULATE MOTION
PICTURE CONTENT
The constitutional limitations on the power of state and local govern-
ments to protect the morals of their citizens through the regulation of the
motion picture medium pose weighty problems. The Supreme Court
recently placed movies within the category of matter protected by the
First Amendment' but has not yet answered the critical question whether
or not any regulation of movies prior to their exhibition can be squared
with constitutional guarantees.' An attempt to determine the need, if any,
for regulation of motion picture content and to appraise the validity of
alternative measures of control in light of applicable Supreme Court
decisions is in order. The right to disseminate ideas freely and the right
of society to be free from moral degenerating forces can probably both
be preserved.'
The Need for Regulation
The need for governmental regulation and the form regulation must
take are dependent upon conditions existing within the movie industry,
the propensity of movies to influence human behavior, the effectiveness
of unofficial pressures, and the adequacy of federal activity in the field.
If the nature of the problem of film content can be understood, then per-
haps the constitutional limitations on regulation can be viewed in proper
perspective.
1. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952). The Burstyn decision
has been followed per curiam in Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960 (1952) and Superior
Films, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 346 U. S. 587 (1954).
2. The question might have been decided this term had not the Court refused to
review A.C.L.U. v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill.2d. 334, 121 N.E.2d. 585 (1954). See 23
U.S. L. WEEK 3242 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1955). The Illinois Supreme Court had upheld a
Chicago ordinance authorizing the Police Commissioner to ban showing of any motion
picture found to be "immoral or obscene." In an able opinion, Chief Justice Schaefer
of the Illinois Court limited the discretion of the Commissioner and the scope of the
standards of the ordinance, but held that censorship as such was not prohibited by the
constitutional guarantees embodied in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See also
discussion in Boxoffice, February 19, 1955, p. 19.
3. Cf. 23 U. CiN. L. REv. 259, 263 (1954).
